The historical development of the jury in Malta and abroad by De Battista, Charles
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
JURY IN MALTA AND ABROAD 
CHARLES DEBATTISTA 
This paper was delivered at a forum organised by the G baqda Stu· 
denti tal-Ligi on March 12th., 1974. 
Your Honour, Members of the Staff, and fellow students, 
All of us here will be aware that perhaps the most popular paro­
dy of the legal profession is embodied in the expression, 'Ladies 
and gentlemen of the Jury ••. ,' normally voiced with as stiff an up­
per lip as possible, and frequently accompanied by the notorious 
pose of hanging on to one's lapels for dear life. Among all legal 
fields, the criminal law is the most glamorous and the most sensa­
tional; and within that field, trial by jury, the most appealing to 
the public sentiment; for it is here that the proverbial ordinary man 
(or woman, now) in the street, is allowed to play a part - other 
than those terrible roles of plaintiff, defendant, accused or witness 
- in that impressively dramatic sanctum which are the law courts.
It is through the institution of the jury that the ordinary people
keep a watchful and effective eye on what goes on in the Court­
room.
We shall attempt in the next few minutes to trace together the 
historical development of the jury in its mother country, England; 
then we shall examine its success there, the �ubstitutes suggested 
in its stead, and its export abroad. We shall than examine the jury 
in our own history, which is mainly divided into periods roughly 
between 1811-1829, 1854-19 34, 19 34-1944 ( the war years), and 
1944-1972. Finally we shall examine some points of divergenc� 
between the Maltese jury and the English jury. 
In its original prototype, the jury w�s only partially. similar, and 
then only in form, to our modern panel of jurors. Just now, we re­
ferred to England as the 'mother country' of the jury: we must, 
however, qualify that reference by saying that England is the ori­
gin of the jury,' as we know it, that is a panel of ordinary citizens 
who compliment the judge's task of adjudication. The jury's real 
origin, however, lies in the ancient inquisition of the_ Frankish 
kings, dating from the 9th century, whereby groups of disinterested 
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neighbours were required to declare under oath information that 
was used to establish royal rights. 
This essentially Frankish institution was carried into the Duchy 
of Normandy, and thence to England, via the Norman Conquest of 
the Anglo Saxons in 1066. Twenty years later, in 10�6 we find the 
jury being employed on a really grand scale - still solely for the 
Crown's benefit - in the compilation of that famous statistician's 
deligh� the Domesday Book. We see therefore that throughout this 
earliest part of the jury's history it was essentially an instrument 
of the body politic, a fact finding commission, as it were, in the 
hands of the State. 
Henry II, however, who reigned from 1154-1189, employed the 
jury for the first dme in the determination of private rights; so that 
a jury of sworn men who knew the facts could decide where the 
boundary of an estate in dispute really lay. Moreover, during Hen­
ry's reign, we find the origin of the criminal jury, which is more at 
issue in this forum than the civil jury. In 1166, ·Henry required that 
a jury of 12 men should present to every county court session, the 
names of men as were notorious murderers or robbers, or re·ceivers 
of such. These men, once name�, would be sent to trial by ordeal, 
the real test of guilt or innocence. We see, therefore, that the jury 
was first merely a body to gather up information, - much like a mo­
dem Inquiry; and, after 111)15, a body whose only task was accusa­
tory, much like the office of the Crown Advocate General today. 
But in 1215, Pope Innocent III disallowed any clerical participa­
tion in the ordeal, thus depriving that ba·rborous travesty of justice 
of its heretofore divine justification. Henry III, therefore, because 
of what appeared to be a purely ecclesiastic measure, was con­
strained to do away with the _already unpopular trial by ordeal, and 
substituted it by what until then had merely been its own prelude -
trial by jury. So in that year, we find the body of 12 accusing men 
transforming itself into a body of 12 judging men. Quite obviously 
to all of us, this transformation created a lacuna, in that the accu­
satory body, could not continue to carry out any such function, in 
compliance with the nemo iudex principle. So another jury of 12 
men was set up to carry out the accusatory functions of the origin­
al jury - thus you had two types of jury developing together. In 
1367, the accusatory jury was increased to 24 in number, and hence 
the name Grand Jury; while the trial jury was left at 12 - hence 
Petty Jury. 
A word here, about this dichotomy, of the Grand and Petty Jur-
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ies, which is of particular relevance to American law, which 
still safeguards, in the 5th Amendment to the Constitution, the ci­
tizen's right to the Grand Jury. The best definition of the functions 
of a Grand Jury, I think, was given by Sir Thomas Maitland in his 
address to the 1st Grand Jury in Malta, where he stated that the 
Grand Jury had to answer the question: 
'whether the evidence adduced before them was so relevant to 
the act stated in the indictments and induced such suspicion 
of the party indicted as to require, for the ends of public jus­
tice, that he should be called upon to answer the charge be­
fore a tribunal competent to proceed to further examination.' 
The Grand Jury, therefore, indicts or accuses, while the Petty 
Jury decides guilt; and in fact, where Grand Juries are employed, 
they are usually rubber-stamps for the Public Prosecutor's Office. 
The British, apparently, lay more cruse in the Attorney-General's 
Office than the Americans, and they saw fit to abolish the Grand 
Jury completely in the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, (even though it 
had become a dead letter long before that date). They thus left all 
accusatory functions up to the Home Office and its subordinates. 
Back now, however, to the general history of the Jury. Black­
stone, who was most vociferous in his defence of the jury system, 
called it 'a barrier between the liberties of che people and the pre­
rogati ve of the Crown'. (Comm. iii. 379) The history of the jury in 
England indicates, however, that the relation of parity between 
Judge, (as appointed by the Royal Prerogative), and Jury, (as rep­
resenting the people) was not as sacrosanct a principle as it is 
nowadays. Regarding the question of unanimity in verdicts, for 
example, judges used to forbid food and drink during deliberation, 
ever since the 14th Century, when unanimous verdicts became 
compulsory. Incidentally, this is still the de jure situation under 
s. 483 of our own Criminal Code. Indeed, until 1640, English Judg­
es actually fined or even imprisoned jurors who acquitted people
whom the judges wished to be convicted. In the notorious case of 
Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, for example, the jury acquitted the ac­
cused, notwithstanding that they had not been allowed to hear the
witnesses in his favour; for this they were imprisoned and ruinous­
ly fineq, the foreman forfeiting £M2,000, whjch was an enonnous
sum in Tudor England. Moreover, this rigour was fatal to Sir John
Throckmorton, who was found guilty on the same-evidence on which
his brother had been acquitted. Lest we run off with the wrong
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idea, though, it is safe to remark that this sort of physical coer­
cion of judges vis-a-vis the jury is obsolete: as we shall see lacer 
on chis evening, the judge's influence on the jury today is subtler 
and more in the interests of Justice. 
We have seen, therefore, the intimate historical connection bet­
ween the jury as we know it and the British Isles. But how popu­
lar is the jury in its natural habitat today? A statistic as recent 
as 1970 indicated that only 5% of all indictable offences are ac­
tually tried by jury: the overwhelming majority of English crimi­
nals far prefer the robed professional to the civilian amateurs. The 
decline and abolition of the Grand Jury in England has already 
been accounted for. The decline of civil juries and criminal juries 
has been ascribed diversely to the rapid growth in the volume of 
litigation in civil cases, the even more rapid growth of summary 
jurisdiction in criminal cases, and a general appreciation that j ur­
ies were both unpredictable and fallible. So even within its own 
birthplace, the jury has been decreasing in popularity. Lee not chis 
prejudice us, however, as co the merits of the jury system: Justice, 
as all of us in this room should be· aware, is not to be measured 
merely, or even primarily, by the statistician's yardstick. In fact, 
the most recent Committee to report on the English Jury System, 
the Morris Committee of 19'55, saw fit to state, despite this admit­
ted drop in numbers: 
'There is we think a fundamental conviction 10 the minds of 
the public, that a jury is in a real sense, a safeguard of our 
liberties.' 
Leaving England now, how has the jury fared abroad? It is ge­
nerally admitted that most exportation as there was, ran into ser­
ious difficulties. This mainly because the delineation between 
judge and jury is hard to draw in an environment which has not had 
Britain's historical background; and also - particularly on the 
Continent - rules of evidence regarding the character of the ac­
cused have not quite caught on. Particularly in the USA, jury trial 
is admitted to have worked badly, partly because of the over-vigo­
rous use of the right of challenge, partly because of intimidation 
and racial problems, and partly because of lack of tactful control 
by presiding judges; also exemptions from jury service leave un­
skilled workers chiefly to qualify. 
Dissatisfaction with the working of the jury system bas given 
rise to various suggestions as to its substitution, among which 
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two deserve special mention: firstly, trial by three judges, giving 
reasons for their decisions and subject to correction on appeal. Se­
condly, the German Schoeffengerichte, which means literally a Ju­
rors' Court, and involves precisely a Bench composed of profes­
sional judges and lay citizens, sitting together, with a two-thirds 
majority vote necessary for conviction. Discussion of these alter­
natives will be conducted later on this evening. 
Before we leave the general development of the jury and start on 
the Maltese experience, I chink it is appropriate here to. make a 
short detour into the political geography of the jury system, and 
see whether we can draw some link between the Jury and Democra­
cy. France, for example, introduced the Jury during the 1789 Re­
volution, and abolished it under the puppet Vichy Government. 
Franco's Spain has no jury at all, and neither does Portugal, even 
though both countries used to enjoy the institution before the ac­
cession of their respective totalitarian regimes. We must not, how­
ever, take chis concurrence with democracy too far: it is interest­
ing to note that even though it was Mussolini who did away with 
the Jury in Italy, it has never been restored in chat country. Mor� 
over, Germany abolished the jury long before Hitler came to power. 
Finally, the jury's popularity on the Continent is restricted to 
Austria, Belgium, Norway, and four of the Swiss cantons. 
And this brings us finally to Malta. As I said earlier, the history 
of the Maltese jury conveniently falls within these periods: 1811-
1829, chat is from Maitland's rule and his Piracy Courts to Pro­
clamation VI of 1829, under Ponsonby; from the 1854 Code to the 
1934 suspension of our constitutional powers; from 1935 to 1944, 
the War Years; and 1944 to the present day. 
The history of Trial by Jury in Malta finds its origin, quite na­
turally, in the British connection. In fact, in 1811, just 11 years 
after we had joined the Empire, Marquis Testaferrata was sent to 
London to press for the introduction of the jury system, which he 
described as the fundamental basis for the proper administration 
of Justice. The 1812 Royal Commission, however, while upholding 
the intrinsic value of the institution, were very unwilling to trans­
plant chis essentially English mechanism to Malta, mainly because 
of the miniscule size of the Island's manpower, which could not 
safely be further depleted by the introduction of Jury Service; and 
also because the close-knit interrelations of Maltese society could 
hardly make for the empanelling of an unbiassed jury. 
However, in 1813, Maida.ad became very concerned about the 
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frequency of piracy on the surrounding seas, and asked foe the set­
ting up of a Commission of Piracy foe Malta, which was, in fact, 
duly granted on the 1st February, 1815. Now, under a Statute pas­
sed by the British House of Commons under George III, Piracy 
Commissions were to be composed of Judge and Jury; and since 
the order setting up the Commission in 1815 required it to be go­
verned 'according to the rules and practice of the British Courts', 
die introduction of the Piracy Commission meant, ipso facto, the 
introduction of the jury in Malta, albeit on a very limited scale. 
We see therefore, that the jury was introduced into Malta not qua a 
jury system, but as an addenda with regard to Piracy, made neces­
sary by an English Statute. The system as introduced was still 
based on the Grand-Petty Jury dichotomy, and the Petty Jury could 
only convict on an unanimous verdict. Despite Maitland's trepida­
tion, expressed bluntly in his opening speech to the Grand Jury, 
the experiment succeeded beyond all expectations. In fact, Mait­
land himself, in his report to the Secretary of State of 1816, was 
constrained to admit that, 'the jury, in every instance, found ac­
cording to the evident Justice of the case submitted to them.' 
Only six years later, however, in 1824, Sic John Richardson, in 
his report to H.M. Government, expressed himself to be against the 
introduction of the Jury in Malta, with the proviso, though, that 
once the English and Maltese sections of the population had been 
fully integrated, then the time would have arrived foe the jury to be 
experimented with on a small scale. 
The appropriate time, however, was to come far earlier than he 
expected, and it came about sooner more b y reason of the appoint­
ment of a new Chief Justice, Sic John Stoddart, than because of any 
increased affinity the Maltese had acquired for their British mas;. 
tees. Sic John Stoddart, appointed as Chief Justice in 1826, imme­
diately started working on various plans with regard to the intro­
duction of the jury into Malta, and in this he was aided by Sic John 
Richardson, and an English-speaking Maltese judge, Dr. Ignazio 
Bonavita. These three legal reformers consulted each other 
throughout the better part of three years, and the two English ju­
rists suggested and counter-suggested new plans to the Govern­
ment, agreeing on broad lines but frequently disagreeing about var­
ious important points of detail, as, for example, whether the jury 
should be an appellate court, or one of first instance; and the 
question whether judge and jury should deliberate alone or together 
(cf. Schoeffengericht). These negotiations ace, however, extremely 
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well dealt with io Dr. H. Harding's 'Maltese Legal History under 
British Rule', aod it would, I feel, be superfluous to reproduce his 
detailed documeotatioo here. 
Be that as it may, all this planoiog between 18215 and 1829 led 
up to Proclamation VI of 1829, enacted oo the 15th of October of 
that year, and this could indeed be said to be the real starting point 
of a Jury System in Malta which enjoyed almost universal applica­
tion. Under this first Jury Law, a Court of Special Commission, 
composed of the Chief Justice, and three or more Commissioners 
who were Judges of the Superior Courts, was established to try 
with a jury crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, and 
cases of complicity in such crimes, irrespective of their punish­
ment. Its jurisdiction depended on annual commissions and could 
be extended. There was no longer a Grand Jury io the English tra­
dition. The jury was composed of a foreman and six common jurors, 
three of whom were drawn from what was termed the Maltese class, 
and the other three from the British. A simple majority was in 
every case sufficient for the validity of a verdict. If the foreman 
disagreed with the verdict, he could say so, in a note attached to 
the verdict. But in capital cases, unless the accused persisted in 
pleading guilty, an unanimous verdict was essential for the passing 
of the death sentence. One final point which will become relevant 
towards the end of this paper: practising lawyers were among those 
exempted from jury service. 
Barely eighteen months later, after the Court of Special Com­
mission had dealt with six cases, of which only one was r"eceived 
with public disapproval, Chief Justice Stoddart deemed fit to ap­
plaud publicly the performance of these first few Maltese juries. 
He said: 
'It is my conscientious opinion that every one of the verdicts 
in these five cases was as correct, as just and as legal as 
could have been given by any tribunal in the world .•• Upon 
the whole, the jurors who served upon these trials have, by 
their conduct, triumphantly refuted the false notion that the 
Maltese are unfit for trial by jury: they have shown that Malta 
is worthy of that great boon conferred on her by the ever me­
morable proclamation of the 15th October, 1829; and they have, 
honourably to themselves and to their country, fulfilled the 
confidence reposed in them by a liberal and enlightened go­
vernment, and have fully justified, so far as they are concern­
ed, the wisdom of the law.' 
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The system continued working well, so well in fact, that in 1845, 
thanks to the pressure brought to bear on Government by Andrew 
Jameson and Sir Antonio Micallef, Crown Advocate, the jurisdiction 
of the jury was extended to all crimes punishable by five years' 
imprisonment or upwards. Finally in 1854, when our first Criminal 
Code was promulgated, art. 435 specifically laid down that all cri­
minal cases, except those tried by the Courts of Judicial Police, 
and appeals from those Courts, shall be tried by H.M. Criminal 
Court, with a jury. 
The next interesting date as far as the history of our jury is 
concerned is 1934, when the British Government, after the suspen­
sion of our 1921 Constitution, and consequent return to gubernator­
ial autocracy, abolished the function of the jury in respect of 
crimes of sedition, an occurrence which harks back to the link I 
tried to describe earlier between the institution of the jury and the 
concept of democracy. 
We come now to the War Years. The second time our predeces­
sors were deprived of the right to trial by jury was during the war, 
for fairly obvious reasons of expediency and the strain on manpo· 
wer. The restitution of the jury in 1944 was acclaimed in Malta, 
and not least among these acclamations was that expressed in that 
year's Journal of the Society under whose auspices we speak to­
day, which called the restitution 'a judicious measure.' 
Our present Code, finally, talks about the jury mainly in Title 
VI, Part II, of Book II, and also in other parts of the Code re lacing 
to procedure. I. do not intend to go through today's law, which I am 
sure we can all peruse at greater leisure elsewhere. The papers 
before you may, however, be helpful when we come to differentiate 
between our law and English law, and also later on during discus· 
sion. One point, however, which I feel I ought to make specifical· 
ly, out of deference to the ladies amongst the audience, is that wo­
men have been allowed voluntary jury service by Act XXXIII of 
1972. 
Having traced thus the history of the jury in Malta down to the 
present day, I shall now attempt to highlight some points of diver· 
gence between the English law and practice regarding juries and 
our own, The factors I will treat are by no means exclusive and the 
only reason for their choice is that they are amongst the most con· 
troversial. Moreover, here I will only state the di vergencies, not 
discuss them. That, I hope, will be the task of the audience. To 
give a quick run-through of these points right now, they are: the 
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property qualification, the foreman and unanimity. 
First, the property qualification. Time does not allow now to go 
into the quantity of property required; so I will dwell only on the 
more important question of the existence of this qualification. As 
far as Britain is concerned, the answer is quite simple: the law re­
quires a propeny qualification. Under Maltese law, however, the 
qualification section, s. 597, has undergone some very interesting 
changes. Under the 1829 jury, a certain amount of property was ab­
solutely necessary. Then the 1854 Code struck a very interesting 
balance between the rigid English property qualification and the 
practical realities of social life in Malta, in the context of which 
such a rigid qualification would exclude quite a lot of able people 
who owned neither houses nor lands. So in 579( 4), that Code ad­
mitted to jury service any person who was competent to serve as a 
juror (e.g. age, nationality etc.,) but did not fulfil the property qua­
lification. This slightly incongruous, but emirien tly practical, mea­
sure was repeated in the 1942 Code in s. 597 (l)(d). The recent Act 
of 1972, referred to above with respect to women jurors, did away 
with the incongruity and upheld the practicability of the 1854 and 
1942 provisions, and we now have no property qualification at all. 
This was, of course, easier to do in the context of Independence. 
Meanwhile, however, and this we must remember, Britain still bears 
a property qualification. 
Now the foreman. The functions of the foreman are described in 
s. 480, and from that section it may appear that his function is pure­
ly mechanical. It is easy to realize, however, that in actual fact,
his psychological position vis-a-vis the common jurors is far more
important than that of a mere clerk. Now, notwithstanding this fair­
ly obvious reality, the British method of choosing a foreman is high­
ly unsatisfactory: the whole thing is meant to be done by election
among the empanelled jurors, but in actual fact, in order to prevent
embarassment in a group of people who are completely new to one
another, it is the Marshall of the Court who suggests one of the pa­
nel, a suggestion more often than not grabbed at by the rest of the
jurors. In Malta, the foreman has always been regarded with greater
care and respect. The Proclamation of 1829, in Art. VII, required
him to have been a juror at least once before; moreover, the impor­
tance which that Proclamation paid to the foreman is also obvious
in Art. XXVII, where the foreman must add an apposite notification
if he disagrees with the verdict of the majority of the jury. Both the
1854 and the 1942 Codes also stipulated that the prim gurat should
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have acted at least once as a common juror. However, one could 
readily realize that this stipulation only makes sense if the person 
chosen is, in actual fact, competent enough to act as a foreman: 
once an ass, always an ass, and it makes no dif ference at all that 
one proves oneself an ass twice, rather than once! Now, I think it 
can safely be argued that one of the professions more suitably 
adapted to the office of foreman is, precisely, the legal profession. 
We come, therefore, to the rather surprising divergence between our 
law and English law, regarding the exemption of lawyers from jury 
service. Our own Courts act on the quite laudable custom that the 
prim gurat is, where possible, a lawyer. In England, on the contra­
ry, lawyers are exempt from all jury service whatsoever. Our own 
Proclamation VI of 1829 - our first Jury Law - likewise exempted 
lawyers, and it is rather hard to reconcile this with the importance 
which that Proclamation attached to the office of foreman, as we 
saw above. Without meaning to advocate any professional snobbery, 
I think it is only in the interests of justice that the Courts pursue 
the usage as it has developed in this matter, in Malta. And I hope 
this will be one of the points treated in discussion. 
Finally, we come to what is, perhaps the most important contro­
versy regarding jury service, and that is the majority required in a 
verdict. Suffice it here to state the facts. In England, the Courts 
accepted a simple majority verdict before the 14th Cent. Then, from 
that time till very recently (1972) an unanimous verdict was requir,­
ed. Now, they have reverted to a majority verdict. In Scotland, they 
have long enjoyed an 8-7 majority, out of a 15-man jury. Malta also 
had a bare majority verdict, under Proclamation VI of 1829; How­
ever, even there, s. XXVII indicates the propensity which the law 
had towards unanimous verdicts in the English tradition, where it 
says: 
'Such judgement of the majority .•• shall be the verdict of the 
jury. Provided that where a verdict is. not unanimous, the num­
ber of the majority will be stated.' 
The propensity, moreover,. of the judges towards unanimous ver­
dicts will also be recalled from Sir J oho Stoddart' s satisfaction 
that the first five Maltese juries all came to unanimous decisions. 
He said, 'One very satisfactory co�sequence resulted from the dis­
passionate examination of the evidence, and that was that it led in 
every �ase to an unanimous verdict.' In the early stages of our jury 
development, therefore, we see this de ;ure sufficiency of a majo-
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rity verdict, but a de facto tendency towards the belief that unani­
mity shows a greater value of justice. 
The change of course towards a via media between unanimity 
and ma�ority in Malta came in 1854, when s. 467 of that year's 
Code stipulated: 
'For every declaration of the jury, whether in favour or against 
the accused, the concurrence of at least six votes shall be ne­
cessary.' 
This two-thirds rule bas been repeated in s. 479 of our present 
Code, and remains in force to the present day. 
Incidentally, there re.mains one instance where the unanimous ver-. 
diet retains its relevance, insofar as our law is concerned; and that 
is the contingency provided for under s. 504, whereby the presiding 
Judge may substitute a sentence of hard labour for life with .a sen­
tence of not less than twelve years, if the jury shall not have been 
unanimous. This certainly seems to imply that our Law admits that 
an unanimous verdict is. a juster verdict. And this prompts one to 
comment that it is rather strange that the Code admits this ultimate 
justice only in the most stringent punishment; and that therefore, 
perhaps, our Law as it. stands, looks at justice from the tail end, as 
it were, from the punishment's side of the scale; rather than from 
the point of view of the lesser criminal who can go to jail for any 
term shorter than life, i.f only six of his fellow citizens think he 
should. I think our legislators should take the bull by the horns 
and look into the very roots of this concept of majority. I hope we 
will, too, in discussion. 
I hope that in this study, I have laid before you such facts as 
may be helpful to us while thinking about and discussing the insti­
tution of the jury. This aspiration of mine is, however, made sub­
ject to one very important, and very uoubling qualification: and that 
is the oracular nature of the jury. I admit that the rule of INCOM­
MUNICADO, enshrined in our s. 482 is important in the interests of 
the particular accused. But once that accused bas been tried, is it 
harmful to interview jurors about their. time in the jury room, as has 
indeed been held in one English case? More boldly, would it be 
harmful to monitor the proceedings of the deliberations ofa .jury, al­
ways of course in the interests of scientific re.search and a better 
insight into the workings of justice? Two students in America were 
once refused such. permissio.n completely. This lack of research
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and this lack of documentation can only lead to the worst type of 
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doubt about the wodcings of our Couns of Law: a doubt based on 
the fact that there are no recorded facts at ail; based therefore on 
doubt itself. This sort of uncertainty, immediately unnoticeable as 
it is, gnaws into society, which .lies at the very root of all justice. 
Io our context, short of a scientific enquiry .into the working of an 
actually operating jwy, I think that mechanism ought to be created 
to facilitate the empanelling of law students as jurors during their 
student years. The whole rationale of this spirit of enquiry could, 
of course, be questioned on the ground that it is superflous, since 
what really matters is what the public thinks of the jury; and since 
there has been nothing but acclamation for the institution, qua in­
stitution, then we must assume that society is happy with .the jury 
as it is. 1rus again warrants lenghtier discussion later .on this 
evening. 
And on this note of acclamation I shall end. Earlier on, I refer­
red to the Law Society's approval of the restoration of the jury in 
post-war years. I failed to mention then, and it. is appropriate to 
mention now, that that same Editorial, in true student tradition, or 
rather anti-tradition, expressed very serious doubts as to. the es­
sential notions of jury trial. I can find no better way to end than to 
quote a relevant passage from that Editorial: 
'As the correspondence columns of the Press have for months 
clamoured for .the restitution (of the jury) and for months pic­
tured it as an unmixed blessing, it is easy for many people to 
pass over the weaknesses and shortcomings of the institution. 
Most of the correspondents were laymen and it is the habit of 
laymen to be effusive and to ignore the opposite viewpoint.' 
I make way now, for the second speaker to examine just these 
opposing viewpoints. Thank You. 
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